Consistency and communication in committees

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.004zbMATH Open1369.91049OpenAlexW1933810427MaRDI QIDQ893390FDOQ893390

Authors: Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar, Mark T. Le Quement 

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63224/1/Accepted_manuscript.pdf

Recommendations

• When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees

zbMATH Keywords

votingcheap talkinformation aggregationcommittees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• An experimental study of collective deliberation
• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Deliberative voting
• Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
• Subgroup deliberation and voting
• Communication compatible voting rules

Cited In (6)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Subgroup deliberation and voting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?

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