Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.006zbMATH Open1330.91031OpenAlexW2071547450MaRDI QIDQ894011FDOQ894011

Authors: Yves Guéron 

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.006

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zbMATH Keywords

imperfect monitoringmonotone gamesirreversibilityvoluntary contributionsgradualismcooperation breakdown

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Cooperation with network monitoring
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.

Cited In (3)

• IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
• A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private

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