Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
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Publication:894065
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.02.001zbMATH Open1330.91025OpenAlexW2168755209MaRDI QIDQ894065FDOQ894065
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.001
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Cited In (14)
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- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- Effects of players' random participation to the stability in LQ games
- PPAD-complete pure approximate Nash equilibria in Lipschitz games
- The Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games
- A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations
- Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs
- Lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria
- PPAD-complete approximate pure Nash equilibria in Lipschitz games
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games
- Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria
- Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games
- Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes
- On the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria and its application to network games
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