Spatial implementation
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Publication:894629
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.011zbMATH Open1347.91127OpenAlexW4251229205MaRDI QIDQ894629FDOQ894629
Authors: Christopher P. Chambers, Richard Lee Brady 
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011
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Cites Work
- Note on the median of a multivariate distribution
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Foundations of Optimization
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
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