The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90062-0MaRDI QIDQ899999zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dominique Lepelley, Boniface Mbih

Publication date 1 January 2016

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90062-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(21)

• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation
• Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules
• Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
• The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
• On probability models in voting theory
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• The expected likelihood of transitivity for a probabilistic chooser

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