Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.010zbMATH Open1330.91062OpenAlexW2212114464MaRDI QIDQ900405FDOQ900405

Authors: Frank Rosar 

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.010

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zbMATH Keywords

optimal delegationinterdependent preferencesaverage mechanismcollective decisionmedian mechanismno monetary transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Group preferences (91B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Asymptotic theory of statistics and probability
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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• Optimal Delegation
• Efficient compromising
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search
• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

Cited In (7)

• Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
• Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
• The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

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