Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.010zbMath1330.91062OpenAlexW2212114464MaRDI QIDQ900405

Frank Rosar

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent preferencesoptimal delegationaverage mechanismcollective decisionmedian mechanismno monetary transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Group preferences (91B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment ⋮ Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation ⋮ Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner ⋮ Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee ⋮ Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

Cites Work

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• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search
• Optimal Delegation

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