Abstract: The undercut procedure was presented by Brams et al. [2] as a procedure for identifying an envy-free allocation when agents have preferences over sets of objects. They assumed that agents have strict preferences over objects and their preferences are extended over to sets of objects via the responsive set extension. We point out some shortcomings of the undercut procedure. We then simplify the undercut procedure of Brams et al. [2] and show that it works under a more general condition where agents may express indifference between objects and they may not necessarily have responsive preferences over sets of objects. Finally, we show that the procedure works even if agents have unequal claims.
Recommendations
- The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
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- Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
- Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for contested pile methods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852
Cites work
- A Class of Sequential Games
- Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
- Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for contested pile methods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5017566 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
- The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
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