The problem of artificial precision in theories of vagueness: a note on the rôle of maximal consistency
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Publication:907884
DOI10.1007/S10670-013-9587-4zbMATH Open1329.03062arXiv1306.4369OpenAlexW3104385729MaRDI QIDQ907884FDOQ907884
Authors: Vincenzo Marra
Publication date: 27 January 2016
Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: The problem of artificial precision is a major objection to any theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are willing to admit that, under sufficiently specified circumstances, a predication of "is red" receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0,1]. You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321. In this note I revisit the problem in the important case of {L}ukasiewicz infinite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the role of maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artificial precision, as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conflates two distinct problems of a very different nature.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4369
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Cited In (5)
- Eliciting uncertainties: a two structure approach
- An empirically supported approach to the treatment of imprecision in vague reasoning
- Implicit definability of truth constants in Łukasiewicz logic
- THREE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF STRICT COHERENCE ON INFINITE-VALUED EVENTS
- Vagueness, rationality and undecidability: A theory of why there is vagueness
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