The propositional objects of mental attitudes
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Publication:916635
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Cites work
- A modification of Parry's analytic implication
- A story semantics for implication
- Analytic implication
- Ontology and grammar: I. Russell's paradox and the general theory of properties in natural language
- The problem of the essential indexical and other essays
- ``The story says that operator in story semantics
Cited in
(25)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1735884 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1028812 (Why is no real title available?)
- Propositions and the substitution anomaly
- Iterated attitudes
- Perspectivism
- The multiple relation theory and Schiffer's puzzle
- The prenective view of propositional content
- Act theories and the attitudes
- A story semantics for implication
- Identity and aboutness
- A theory of propositions
- Truth ascriptions, falsity ascriptions, and the paratactic analysis of indirect discourse
- Perception, memory, and imagination as propositional attitudes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2226176 (Why is no real title available?)
- Belief and the principle of identity
- Transparent readings and privileged worlds
- Individual concepts in modal predicate logic
- A general logic of propositional attitudes
- Propositional attitudes without propositions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748574 (Why is no real title available?)
- Propositions and same-saying: introduction
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1755780 (Why is no real title available?)
- Why fuss about these quirks of the vernacular? Propositional attitude sentences in Prior's \textit{nachlass}
- Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes
- Relatively about: Loose composites and loose ends
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