Sen's theorem for hierarchies

DOI10.1016/J.EJC.2007.06.002MaRDI QIDQ925028zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert C. Powers

Publication date 29 May 2008

Published in European Journal of Combinatorics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejc.2007.06.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

The conflict between the Pareto condition and individual rights within the area of social choice is analyzed for consensus functions on hierarchies.

Recommendations

• Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
• The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience)
• Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and dictatorship
• Dictatorial consensus functions on \(n\)-trees
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5308074

Cites work

• Are Individual Rights Possible?
• Axiomatic Consensus Theory in Group Choice and Biomathematics
• Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1974590 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independence conditions for consensus n-trees revisited
• Tree structures for proximity data

Cited in

(2)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 464822 (Why is no real title available?)
• Source of complexity in the social and managerial sciences: an extended Sen's theorem

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