Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.06.009MaRDI QIDQ926879zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tarek Coury, Vladimir P. Petkov

Publication date 21 May 2008

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:bbf7e685-5184-446f-8f6b-bd77984b35bd

zbMATH Keywords

delegationdurable goods monopolyperfect rational expectations equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Delegated management in dynamic duopolies
• Repeated delegation
• Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Optimal Delegation

Cites work

• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs
• Time-Consistent Public Policy

Cited in

(5)

• Delegation in oligopoly: managerial schemes and loan commitments
• Delegated management in dynamic duopolies
• How delegation improves commitment
• Repeated delegation
• Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium

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