Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.006zbMath1136.91390MaRDI QIDQ928883

Nizar Allouch, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 11 June 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

core; decentralization; clubs; local public goods; Tiebout hypothesis; Edgeworth; competitive pricing; hedonic coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B10: Group preferences

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Market Games and Clubs, Networks and Stability, On the core of dynamic cooperative games, Share equilibrium in local public good economies, On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games, Fractional matching markets, Club theory and household formation, Dynamic club formation with coordination, Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores, Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability, Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization, Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies, Constitutions and groups, Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies, On the use of public goods, Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment, Endogenous formation of security exchanges, Paths to stability for overlapping group structures

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