Taxation, agency conflicts, and the choice between callable and convertible debt

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.014MaRDI QIDQ960264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher A. Hennessy, Yuri Tserlukevich

Publication date 16 December 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.014

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic differential gamesagencycapital structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Recommendations

• A NONZERO‐SUM GAME APPROACH TO CONVERTIBLE BONDS: TAX BENEFIT, BANKRUPTCY COST, AND EARLY/LATE CALLS
• Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 176010 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Two‐Person Game for Pricing Convertible Bonds
• Agency Conflicts and Risk Management*
• An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model of Asset Prices
• Asymptotic expansions for Markov processes with Lévy generators
• Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games With Stopping Times and Free Boundary Problems
• On the pathwise uniqueness of solutions of one-dimensional stochastic differential equations
• Perpetual Convertible Bonds
• Prospect theory and liquidation decisions
• Super contact and related optimality conditions
• Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation

Cited in

(7)

• Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt
• Game options analysis of the information role of call policies in convertible bonds
• Financial decisions involving credit default swaps over the business cycle
• A NONZERO‐SUM GAME APPROACH TO CONVERTIBLE BONDS: TAX BENEFIT, BANKRUPTCY COST, AND EARLY/LATE CALLS
• Prepayment risk on callable bonds: theory and test
• A game options approach to the investment problem with convertible debt financing
• The Determinants of Private Debt Source

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