Manipulation via capacities revisited

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.006zbMath1230.91144OpenAlexW2238615876MaRDI QIDQ980957

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymanipulationtwo-sided matchingcapacities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Characterizations of the cumulative offer process

Cites Work

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• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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