Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
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Publication:981035
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.01.005zbMATH Open1245.91036OpenAlexW2093333858MaRDI QIDQ981035FDOQ981035
Authors: Jan Eeckhout, Philipp Kircher 
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29704/
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- The construction of an optimal distribution of search effort
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
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- Directed search with multiple job applications
- On a theorem of Schmeidler
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- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
- A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
- Incentives in competitive search equilibrium
- Sorting and decentralized price competition
- On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
- Excess worker reallocation
Cited In (36)
- Poisson search
- Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
- Free parking for all in shopping malls
- Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
- Equivalence of canonical matching models
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
- Introduction to search theory and applications
- Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons
- Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions
- A theory of sticky rents: search and bargaining with incomplete information
- Should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market?
- Directed search and the Bertrand paradox
- Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection
- Directed search with endogenous capacity
- Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
- Sorting and decentralized price competition
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
- Minimum prices in a model with search frictions and price posting
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- Strategic limitation of market accessibility: search platform design and welfare
- All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers
- Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- Too much waste, not enough rationing: the failure of stochastic, competitive markets
- Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- It's about time: implications of the period length in an equilibrium search model
- Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
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