Introduction to knowability and beyond
This paper introduces an issue of Synthese (namely, Vol. 173, No. 1) devoted to discussions of Fitch's paradox (also known as the ``Church-Fitch paradox), a proof which appears to show from very modest premisses that, if all truths are knowable in principle, then they are all known. Anti-realisms and verificationist theories of meaning generally endorse the antecedent of this conditional, but few would concede its consequent. The papers of this issue include some exploring the options for verificationists / intuitionists like Michael Dummett, some exploring a response from the point of view of Dorothy Edgington's situation-theoretic epistemic theory of actual truth, and some exploring the possibility that there are essential limits to human knowledge. The issue reprints the 1981 paper ``Necessary limits of knowledge: Unknowable truths by \textit{Richard Routley} (later \textit{Sylvan}) [see Synthese 173, No.~1, 107--122 (2010; Zbl 1198.03017)], of which the original source is out of print.
- On a new tentative solution to Fitch's paradox
- An axiomatic version of Fitch's paradox
- A Church-Fitch proof for the universality of causation
- New essays on the knowability paradox.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5880530 (Why is no real title available?)
- On what we don't know
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1252396 (Why is no real title available?)
- Descriptions and unknowability
- The paradox of idealization
- An argument concerning the unknowable
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7085123 (Why is no real title available?)
- The ambiguity of knowability
- On Signatures of Knowledge
- A Kripkean approach to unknowability and truth
- Verificationists versus realists: The battle over knowability
- Knowability and the capacity to know
- Necessary limits to knowledge: Unknowable truths
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