Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
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Cites work
- A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
- A Shapley value representation of potential games
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
- Best-response potential games
- Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
- Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Free mobility equilibrium in a local public goods economy with congestion
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games
- Potential games
- Potential maximizers and network formation
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
Cited in
(10)- Contractually stable networks
- Club formation by rational sharing: Content, viability and community structure
- Dynamic club formation with coordination
- An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
- Constitutions and groups
- Network potentials
- Stable and efficient coalitional networks
- Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
- Clubs and networks
- Correction to: ``Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions
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