Regulation of fisheries bycatch with common-pool output quotas

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2008.04.003zbMATH Open1194.91136OpenAlexW2041038289MaRDI QIDQ994063FDOQ994063

Authors: Joshua K. Abbott, James E. Wilen 

Publication date: 17 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.04.003

Recommendations

• An economic analysis of the fisheries bycatch problem
• Fishery Regulation with Harvest Uncertainty
• Controlling stock externalities in a common property fishery subject to uncertainty
• Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding
• Quota-induced discarding in heterogeneous fisheries

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryfisheries managementcommon propertyquotasbycatch

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the commons
• Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
• An economic analysis of the fisheries bycatch problem
• Quota-induced discarding in heterogeneous fisheries
• Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding

Cited In (2)

• Species dispersal and biodiversity in human-dominated metacommunities
• Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty

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