Regulation of fisheries bycatch with common-pool output quotas

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2008.04.003MaRDI QIDQ994063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joshua K. Abbott, James E. Wilen

Publication date 17 September 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryfisheries managementcommon propertyquotasbycatch

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• An economic analysis of the fisheries bycatch problem
• Fishery Regulation with Harvest Uncertainty
• Controlling stock externalities in a common property fishery subject to uncertainty
• Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding
• Quota-induced discarding in heterogeneous fisheries

Cites work

• An economic analysis of the fisheries bycatch problem
• Cooperation in the commons
• Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
• Quota-induced discarding in heterogeneous fisheries
• Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding

Cited in

(2)

• Species dispersal and biodiversity in human-dominated metacommunities
• Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty

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