Exchange rate pegs, fiscal policy and credibility
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Publication:995655
DOI10.1007/S11079-007-9004-1zbMATH Open1187.91130OpenAlexW2013245315WikidataQ115146099 ScholiaQ115146099MaRDI QIDQ995655FDOQ995655
Authors: Torben M. Andersen, Julia Chiriaeva 
Publication date: 10 September 2007
Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-007-9004-1
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- Foreign exchange intervention and inflation targeting: the role of credibility
- The effect of monetary and fiscal credibility on exchange rate pass-through in an emerging economy
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