A recursive core for partition function form games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:995676
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9030-xzbMath1161.91310MaRDI QIDQ995676
Publication date: 10 September 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities, Coalition formation in games with externalities, Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty, Traffic routing oligopoly, The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games, Strategic behavior under partial cooperation, Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core, Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities, Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness, Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach, The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game, Consistency and the core in games with externalities, Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities, Games in sequencing situations with externalities, The projective core of symmetric games with externalities, Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games, Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach, Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities, Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities, On convexity in cooperative games with externalities, Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities, On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games, Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms, The recursive core for non-superadditive games, Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games, Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- The Core of a Public Goods Economy
