On the learnability of majority rule

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.03.012MaRDI QIDQ996375zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuval Salant

Publication date 14 September 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.012

zbMATH Keywords

learningmajority ruletournamentssocial choicechoice functionscommittees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5542185 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3473265 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1322222 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221981 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A combinatorial problem; stability and order for models and theories in infinitary languages
• Learnability and rationality of choice.
• On the density of families of sets
• Social choice and individual values
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?

Cited in

(4)

• The learnability of voting rules
• Simple games with many effective voters
• Committee, expert advice, and the weighted majority algorithm: an application to the pricing decision of a monopolist
• Voting: a machine learning approach

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