On the learnability of majority rule

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.03.012zbMATH Open1186.91095OpenAlexW2168953334MaRDI QIDQ996375FDOQ996375

Authors: Yuval Salant 

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.012

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zbMATH Keywords

learningmajority ruletournamentssocial choicechoice functionscommittees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A combinatorial problem; stability and order for models and theories in infinitary languages
• On the density of families of sets
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learnability and rationality of choice.

Cited In (3)

• The learnability of voting rules
• Simple games with many effective voters
• Committee, expert advice, and the weighted majority algorithm: an application to the pricing decision of a monopolist

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