The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:996377
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.001zbMath1186.91081MaRDI QIDQ996377
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.001
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