The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.001zbMath1186.91081MaRDI QIDQ996377

Mark Fey, Jae-Hoon Kim

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

elections; voting; private information; pivotal voter; adversarial preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections, Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility, The fragility of information aggregation in large elections, Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers, Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences, Voting on tricky questions, Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting, Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates