Quantifying the likelihood of learning collusive strategy equilibria

DOI10.1063/5.0281443MaRDI QIDQ6886053zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors J. M. Meylahn

Publication date 10 December 2025

Published in Chaos (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0281443

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Ordinary differential equations (34-XX) Dynamical systems and ergodic theory (37-XX)

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