Reconsidering no-go theorems from a practical perspective
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Abstract: I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models which are compatible with a given quantum no-go theorem implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible implications of this for our understanding of the limits of classical description, and for our understanding of the fundamental aim of physical investigation.
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Cited in
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