Recovering single-crossing preferences from approval ballots
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A characterization of the single-crossing domain
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Core-stable committees under restricted domains
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- Handbook on approval voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777260 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- Permuting matrices to avoid forbidden submatrices
- Recognizing 1-Euclidean preferences: an alternative approach
- Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
- Recognizing top-monotonic preference profiles in polynomial time
- Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy
- Social choice and individual values
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs, and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
This page was built for publication: Recovering single-crossing preferences from approval ballots
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6609139)
