Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A consistent bargaining set
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Consistency, replication invariance, and generalized Gini bargaining solutions
- Consistent extensions
- Distributive justice in taxation
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Stability and Collective Rationality
- The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(11)- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3885582 (Why is no real title available?)
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Reduction theorems in the social choice theory
- Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
- A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Reduction in problem size for ranking alternatives in group decision- making
- A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
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