Reputation and impermanent types
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Cites work
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
- Firm reputation with hidden information
- Game theory
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation and imperfect information
- The chain store paradox
- Who wants a good reputation?
Cited in
(18)- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- Bounded memory and incomplete information
- Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
- Reputation building through costly adjustment
- Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
- The dynamics of reputations
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- The dynamics of collective reputation
- Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
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