Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
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Recommendations
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
Cites work
- A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Control and bribery in voting
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting
- Large-scale election campaigns: combinatorial shift bribery
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- On making a distinguished vertex of minimum degree by vertex deletion
- Parameterized algorithms
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(6)- Being Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place in an Election – Voter Deterrence by Deletion of Candidates
- Reasonable elections don’t exist!
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747953 (Why is no real title available?)
- A group decision-making and optimization method based on relative inverse number
- On the complexity of winner determination and strategic control in conditional approval voting
- Search versus search for collapsing electoral control types
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