Response to Bonanno and Nehring

DOI10.1023/A:1005043021942MaRDI QIDQ1280576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert Stalnaker

Publication date 5 October 1999

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005043021942

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumperfect information gamesstrong rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

This is a response to \textit{G. Bonanno} and \textit{K. Nehring} [Theor. Decis. 45, No. 3, 291-295 (1998; Zbl 0921.90149)], who had commented a previous paper of the author [Theor. Decis. 37, No. 1, 49-73 (1994; Zbl 0805.90150)].

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