Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction

DOI10.1023/A:1009942024096MaRDI QIDQ1595288zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors R. Mark Isaac, Duncan James

Publication date 26 November 2001

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009942024096

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cited in

(8)

• A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• Combinatorial auction design
• Scheduling with package auctions
• Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

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