SOLUTION UNIQUENESS IN A CLASS OF CURRENCY CRISIS GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000697MaRDI QIDQ5716149zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors C. W. Bauer

Publication date 9 January 2006

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000697

zbMATH Keywords

capacityglobal gamesnon additive product measureunique equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• Canonical Representation of Set Functions
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms

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(4)

• Products of non-additive measures: a Fubini-like theorem
• CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS
• Speculative attacks with multiple targets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 220041 (Why is no real title available?)

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