Scheduler-Pointed False Data Injection Attack for Event-Based Remote State Estimation

DOI10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2024.111523MaRDI QIDQ6380334zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Qiulin Xu, Junlin Xiong

Publication date 14 October 2021

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2024.111523

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Networked control (93B70) Discrete event control/observation systems (93C65) Control/observation systems involving computers (process control, etc.) (93C83) Estimation and detection in stochastic control theory (93E10)

Abstract: In this paper, an attack problem is investigated for event-based remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems. Our objective is to degrade the effect of the event-based scheduler while bypassing a $ch{i}^2$ false data detector. A two-channel scheduler-pointed false data injection attack strategy is proposed by modifying the numerical characteristics of innovation signals. The attack strategy is proved to be always existent, and an algorithm is provided to find it. Under the proposed attack strategy, the scheduler becomes almost invalid and the performance of the remote estimator is degraded. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate our theoretical results.

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Cited in

(1)

• State estimation for systems subject to hybrid DoS and FDI attacks with unknown attack parameters

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