Security Analysis of Two Distance-Bounding Protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-25286-0_7MaRDI QIDQ2902477zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh

Publication date 20 August 2012

Published in RFID. Security and Privacy (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1107.3047, http://hdl.handle.net/1956/6110

zbMATH Keywords

distance bounding protocoldistance fraudprivacyRFID

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the security of two recently proposed distance bounding protocols called the Hitomi and the NUS protocols. Our results show that the claimed security of both protocols has been overestimated. Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible to a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in violating the privacy of the protocol but also can be exploited for further attacks such as impersonation, ma?a fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Our results also demonstrates that the probability of success in a distance fraud attack against the NUS protocol can be increased up to (3/4)^n and even slightly more, if the adversary is furnished with some computational capabilities.

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Cited in

(9)

• Assumption-based analysis of distance-bounding protocols with \textsc{cpsa}
• Short paper: Terrorist fraud in distance bounding: getting around the models
• Analysis of false-reject probability in distance bounding protocols with mixed challenges over RFID noisy communication channel
• On modeling terrorist frauds. Addressing collusion in distance bounding protocols
• On the pseudorandom function assumption in (secure) distance-bounding protocols. PRF-ness alone does not stop the frauds!
• Optimal proximity proofs
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