Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.09.006MaRDI QIDQ2384433zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. Gerardi, Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 21 September 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723686

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamescommunicationcommunication equilibriumsequential communication equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Recommendations

• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Multistage Games with Communication
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Cites work

• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Long Cheap Talk
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Universal Mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

Cited in

(16)

• An integrative approach with sequential game to real-time gate assignment under CDM mechanism
• Sequential equilibria in signaling games
• Self-rejecting mechanisms
• Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Sequential equilibria in signaling games
• Correlated equilibria and communication in games
• Mechanism design with informational punishment
• Perfect implementation
• Flights assignment model of multiple airports based on game theory and CDM mechanism
• Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
• Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
• ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
• Privately designed correlated equilibrium
• Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
• Bounding the communication complexity of fault-tolerant common coin tossing

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