Simplex subtraction to estimate unanimity violations in sequential majority voting

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2025.102462MaRDI QIDQ6890767zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Christian Klamler

Publication date 2 December 2025

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2025.102462

zbMATH Keywords

geometrysequential majority votingunanimity overruled

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites work

• Basic Geometry of Voting

This page was built for publication: Simplex subtraction to estimate unanimity violations in sequential majority voting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6890767)