Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.014MaRDI QIDQ900442zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John van den Berghe, Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.014

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitycomplexityskill

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Playing the wrong game: an experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation
• Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication
• Skill in Games
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• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3135430 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning by matching patterns.
• Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
• Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• When more is less: limited consideration

Cited in

(7)

• Natural strategic ability
• Playing the wrong game: an experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation
• Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning?
• Skill in Games
• Skills, efficiency, and timing in a simple attack and defense model
• Trait-augmented games with limited-skill agents
• Games, Incompetence, and Training

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