Slow and Ordinary Provability for Peano Arithmetic

MaRDI QIDQ6270154zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Paula Henk, Fedor N. Pakhomov

Publication date 4 February 2016

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recursive ordinals and ordinal notations (03F15) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40) Provability logics and related algebras (e.g., diagonalizable algebras) (03F45) Nonstandard models of arithmetic (03H15)

Abstract: The notion of slow provability for Peano Arithmetic ($mathsfPA$) was introduced by S.D. Friedman, M. Rathjen, and A. Weiermann. They studied the slow consistency statement $mathrm{Con}_{mathsfs}$ that asserts that a contradiction is not slow provable in $mathsfPA$. They showed that the logical strength of $mathsfPA+mathrm{Con}_{mathsfs}$ lies strictly between that of $mathsfPA$ and $mathsfPA$ together with its ordinary consistency: $mathsfPAsubsetneqmathsfPA+mathrm{Con}_{mathsfs}subsetneqmathsfPA+mathrmCon$. This paper is a further investigation into slow provability and its interplay with ordinary provability in $mathsfPA$. We study three variants of slow provability. The associated consistency statement of each of these yields a theory that lies strictly between $mathsfPA$ and $mathsfPA+mathrmCon$ in terms of logical strength. We investigate Turing-Feferman progressions based on these variants of slow provability. We show that for our three notions, the Turing-Feferman progression reaches $mathsfPA+mathrmCon$ in a different numbers of steps, namely $varepsilo{n}_0$, $omega$, and $2$. For each of the three slow provability predicates, we also determine its joint provability logic with ordinary $mathsfPA$-provability.

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