Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency

DOI10.2307/2526437MaRDI QIDQ3958229zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sheng Cheng Hu

Publication date 1982

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526437

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic efficiencygolden rulelifetime utilitymajority-votingmisrepresentation of preferencessocial securitytaxingthree- period overlapping generations model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

This page was built for publication: Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3958229)