Cited in
(40)- Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs: weaker assumptions and mechanized verification
- Computationally sound abstraction and verification of secure multi-party computations
- Formal Verification of a Key Establishment Protocol for EPC Gen2 RFID Systems: Work in Progress
- Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties
- Verifying a signature architecture: a comparative case study
- From security protocols to pushdown automata
- Computer Aided Verification
- Distributed temporal logic for the analysis of security protocol models
- Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and a cost-sensitive guessing intruder is NP-complete
- On the semantics of Alice \& Bob specifications of security protocols
- A Formal Language for Cryptographic Pseudocode
- Intruder deduction for the equational theory of abelian groups with distributive encryption
- On Establishing and Fixing a Parallel Session Attack in a Security Protocol
- On-the-Fly Model Checking of Fair Non-repudiation Protocols
- HERMES
- YAPA
- AVISPA
- CASPA_
- FAST
- Casper
- ProVerif
- SATMC
- scyther
- Maude-NPA
- NRL
- Cryptyc
- TAMARIN
- CoSP
- Interrogator
- A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties
- Authentication Revisited: Flaw or Not, the Recursive Authentication Protocol
- State space reduction in the Maude-NRL protocol analyzer
- \textsf{CaPiTo}: Protocol stacks for services
- Model Checking Security Protocols
- Automated type-based analysis of injective agreement in the presence of compromised principals
- Computing knowledge in equational extensions of subterm convergent theories
- The Open-Source Fixed-Point Model Checker for Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols
- On the Automated Correction of Protocols with Improper Message Encoding
- Efficient representation of the attacker's knowledge in cryptographic protocols analysis
- Security protocols analysis including various time parameters
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