Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth
In \textit{S. Kripke}'s theory of truth [J. Philos. 72, 690-716 (1975)], the statement that A is true need not be true or false; hence `true' in that theory is a partial predicate. Reinhardt here argues that Kripke's theory can be regarded as an implementation of a suggestion of \textit{K. Gödel} [in P. A. Schilpp (ed.): The philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Evanston, 1946)] to resolve the semantic paradoxes using the notion of meaningful applicability. The paper contains extensive discussions of other work on the paradoxes, especially \textit{T. Burge} [J. Philos. 76, 169-198 (1979)], but strangely neglects other writing on significance logic and nonsense, e.g., \textit{L. Goddard} and \textit{R. Routley} [The logic of significance and context. Vol. I (1973; Zbl 0302.02004)].
- Notes on models of (partial) Kripke-Feferman truth
- Remarks on compositionality and weak axiomatic theories of truth
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1984276
- Predicate logical extensions of some subintuitionistic logics
- Truth, partial logic and infinitary proof systems
- A note on the unprovability of consistency in formal theories of truth
- Logics of partial predicates with extended renominations and quantifiers
- Constructing a continuum of predicate extensions of each intermediate propositional logic
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 549984
- Some remarks on approximate entailment
- An extension of basic logic
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3987249 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3722625 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484054 (Why is no real title available?)
- Necessity predicates and operators
- Notes on naive semantics
- Outline of a Theory of Truth
- Proper classes
- Toward useful type-free theories. I
- Truth and paradox
- Ungroundedness in classical languages
- Property theory: The type-free approach \(v\). The Church approach
- Truth, partial logic and infinitary proof systems
- Provably true sentences across axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth
- Norms of truth and logical revision
- Minimalism and the generalisation problem: on Horwich's second solution
- Axiomatic theories of partial ground. II: Partial ground and hierarchies of typed truth
- On the costs of nonclassical logic
- Levels of truth
- Truth, reflection and hierarchies
- Notes on models of (partial) Kripke-Feferman truth
- Truth and the Liar
- Modality and axiomatic theories of truth. II: Kripke-Feferman
- A theory of formal truth arithmetically equivalent to ID1
- More on Systems of Truth and Predicative Comprehension
- AXIOMS FOR DETERMINATENESS AND TRUTH
- Stenius on the paradoxes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3987249 (Why is no real title available?)
- Disquotational truth and analyticity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 896242 (Why is no real title available?)
- INCOMPLETENESS VIA PARADOX AND COMPLETENESS
- Deflationary truth and the ontology of expressions
- Feferman and the Truth
- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory of truth
- Reducing compositional to disquotational truth
- , , AND REINHARDT’S PROGRAM
- On meaningfulness and truth
- A Kripkean approach to unknowability and truth
- Bicontextualism
- CLASSICAL DETERMINATE TRUTH I
- The Primacy of the Classical? Saul Kripke Meets Niels Bohr
- The substitutional analysis of logical consequence
- Non-contractability and revenge
- Well-behaved truth
- In defence of PKF
- Gaps, gluts, and theoretical equivalence
- Is the HYPE about strength warranted?
- On classical determinate truth
- On the costs of classical logic
- Truth and meaning
This page was built for publication: Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1093626)
