Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
zbMATH Open document ID: 0845.90020
DOI: 10.1007/BF01078985
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1996-02-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 849115
zbMATH Keywords: simple majority voting
zbMATH Keywords: sincere preferences
author: I. D. A. Macintyre
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
cites work: The Pareto rule and strategic voting
cites work: Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
cites work: Q4196192
cites work: Consistent Voting Systems
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 849115