Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91124
author: Ning Chen
author: Arpita Ghosh
author: Nicolas S. Lambert
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6305601
zbMATH Keywords: social lending
zbMATH Keywords: peer-to-peer lending
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: j.geb.2013.05.004
OpenAlex ID: W2156951735
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2013.05.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305601