Robust contracting in general contract spaces
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust contracting in general contract spaces
zbMATH Open document ID: 1492.91171
author: Yanyan Li
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-05-31T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.12516
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B41
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G15
zbMATH DE Number: 7535159
zbMATH Keywords: robust contracts
zbMATH Keywords: nonmetrizable contract spaces
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: financial markets
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
OpenAlex ID: W3138799859
arXiv ID: 1910.12516
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-021-01354-9
description: scientific article