Sequential search and firm prominence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential search and firm prominence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1498.91192
author: Rodrigo Yañez
author: José A. Carrasco
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-08-31T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 7579330
zbMATH Keywords: search theory
zbMATH Keywords: prominence
zbMATH Keywords: pricing
zbMATH Keywords: oligopoly
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: s00199-021-01363-8
OpenAlex ID: W3157915785
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-021-01363-8
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7579330