An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
zbMATH Open document ID: 1314.91084
author: Yanyan Li
published in: Games
publication date: 2015-06-23T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by conflict with a random outcome. Observed demands at each stage are significantly correlated with power, as measured by the probability of winning in the event of disagreement. Demand patterns, however, are flatter than theoretical predictions, and conflict occurs in a significant proportion of the interactions, regardless of the degree of the power asymmetry. To address these deviations from the standard game-theoretic predictions, we also estimated a logit quantal response model, which generated the qualitative patterns that are observed in the data. This one-parameter generalization of the Nash equilibrium permits a deconstruction of the strategic incentives that cause demands to be less responsive to power asymmetries than Nash predictions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6449132
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: conflict
zbMATH Keywords: quantal response equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: laboratory experiments
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: g4030375
OpenAlex ID: W2034942708
cites work: A backward induction experiment
cites work: Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
cites work: Regular quantal response equilibrium
cites work: The Nash equilibrium: A perspective
cites work: Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
cites work: Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
cites work: Bargaining in the shadow of power
cites work: Q3234482
DOI: 10.3390/G4030375
Recommended article: Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Recommended article: A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences
Recommended article: Bargaining with random implementation: an experimental study
Recommended article: Bargaining in the shadow of power
Recommended article: Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis
copyright license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6449132