Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
zbMATH Open document ID: 1398.91027
author: Joseph Y. Halpern
author: Yoram Moses
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2017-08-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.01236
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6760407
zbMATH Keywords: characterizing solution concepts
zbMATH Keywords: common knowledge of rationality
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: quasi-perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
OpenAlex ID: W2345670173
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-016-0535-9
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6760407