On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1287.91070
author: Souvik Roy
author: Ton Storcken
author: Hans Peters
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2014-05-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6296215
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: s00355-011-0621-7
OpenAlex ID: W2139370923
cites work: Q4495209
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-011-0621-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6296215