When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
zbMATH Open document ID: 1132.91396
author: Richard Chisik
author: Robert J. Lemke
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2006-08-18T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: wp021.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B72
zbMATH DE Number: 5047690
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
OpenAlex ID: W2166075674
cites work: Q3614999
cites work: Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
cites work: The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
cites work: Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
cites work: Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0082-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5047690