Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
zbMATH Open document ID: 1498.91347
author: Carlo Prato
author: Stephane Wolton
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-09-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7591785
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: elections
zbMATH Keywords: representative democracy
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: j.geb.2022.05.010
OpenAlex ID: W4281741554
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.05.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7591785