Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
author: Segismundo S. Izquierdo
author: Luis R. Izquierdo
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2023-02-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 7656643
zbMATH Keywords: payoff sampling
zbMATH Keywords: best experienced payoff
zbMATH Keywords: procedural rationality
zbMATH Keywords: asymptotically stable sets
zbMATH Keywords: closed under payoff sampling
describes a project that uses: EvoDyn-3s
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: j.geb.2022.12.006
OpenAlex ID: W4313216274
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.12.006
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copyright license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7656643